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TAX INCIDENCE IN A MODEL WITH EFFICIENCY WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
1. Introduction 
It is generally recognized by now that the simple two-sector general equilibrium model has 
been a very useful tool in analyzing tax incidence
1. Most of the analyses, however, have been 
conducted under the assumption that perfect competition prevails in all markets, and as a result 
there is no unemployment. It is, of course, true that some authors have relaxed the assumptions 
of perfect competition in the product or labor markets, but still in most of these studies the 
distortions are exogenous rather than derived from the optimizing behavior of agents.
2 To 
overcome this shortcoming, Davidson and Matusz (1988) introduced an explicit search theory 
of voluntary unemployment into the two-sector model, and showed how endogenously derived 
frictions affect income distribution and the other variables of the model. 
Later, Agell and Lundborg (1992) extended the two-sector model by introducing a fair wage 
hypothesis and, therefore, allowing for involuntary unemployment.  The authors, following the 
gift/exchange model developed by Akerlof (1982), examine the effects of various policy 
instruments, such as taxation and unemployment benefits, on income distribution, resource 
allocation and unemployment. With regard to the effects of taxation, the results of the above 
paper are not very different, at least qualitatively, from those derived by the classic article of 
Harberger (1962), but we can obtain some interesting insights about the role of taxation not 
only on income distribution but also on unemployment. 
                                                           
1 For a recent and quite comprehensive review of the literature on tax incidence, see (Fullerton and Metcalf). 
2 See, for example, Anderson and Ballentine (1976), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), and Davidson, Martin, and 
Matusz (1988) who relax the assumption of perfect competition in the product markets. Jones (1971), Johnson and 
Mieszkowski (1970) and Imam and Whalley (1985) have focused on labor market features like unemployment and 
wage rigidities. Of particular interest is the work of Lockwood (1990) who introduces imperfections in both 
product and labor markets. 2 
The purpose of the present paper is to examine the effects of taxation on income distribution in 
a model with efficiency wages and involuntary unemployment. Central to the efficiency-wage 
theory is the hypothesis that firms may set wages above market-clearing levels, whenever the 
productivity of labor depends positively on the real wage paid by the firm.
3  In what follows we 
adopt the efficiency-wage hypothesis, and specify worker’s effort norm as a function of real 
wages and unemployment. 
From a methodological point of view, our approach is very close to that of Agell and Lundborg 
(1994), with one basic difference. Agell and Lunborg assume that worker’s effort function 
depends on unemployment and a fair wage, the latter being defined as the ratio of wages 
received by the workers and the returns to capital owners in the firm. Our approach, however, 
assumes that workers’ effort depends on the real wage as defined by the nominal wage divided 
by a price index. In other words, we argue that workers’ effort function depends not on the 
wage-profit differential and unemployment, as in Agell and Lundborg (1994), but on the real 
reward of their effort and the level of unemployment. The efficiency wage hypothesis is much 
more usual in the literature and is considered as more realistic than the fair wage hypothesis. 
A theoretical explanation for this approach is provided in the second part of this paper. In the 
third part, the efficiency-wage hypothesis is incorporated into the simple two-sector model, and 
the basic relations of the model are derived. In the fourth part, we examine the effects of factor 
and commodity taxes on income distribution, on resource allocation and unemployment. In the 
last section, we summarize the main results of our analysis and compare our findings with 
those of Agell and Lundborg, but also with those derived by the standard analysis of tax 
incidence as developed, for example, by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). 
                                                           
3 For the microfoundations of the efficiency-wage theories, the interested reader can consult a large number of 
papers, for example, Solow (1979), Akerlof (1982), Stiglitz (1986), Weiss (1990). For the macroeconomic 
implications of the efficiency-wage theories a very useful survey is provided by Fischer (1989). 3 
2.  An efficiency-wage model in which real wage matters 
We assume that the representative worker in firm i  maximizes a utility function that is 
separable in commodity and effort arguments. Following Levine (1989) and Agell and 
Lundborg (1992), the effort arguments are represented by utility ui
e, which includes the 
individual’s effort ei.  We assume, in particular, that the effort function depends on the cost to 
workers of losing their jobs.  The cost of job loss depends in turn on the expected duration of 
unemployment, and the difference between the current real wage and the unemployment 
benefit and the wage expected at the next job. An intuitive explanation for this function could 
be the following. If a worker is fired and the unemployment spell is long, or the unemployment 
benefits are far below current pay, or if pay in other jobs is far below the current pay, then 
she/he is expected to work very hard. Assuming further that all workers and firms are identical, 
that the unemployment benefits are exogenously set, and that the duration of unemployment is 
positively associated with the economy-wide level of unemployment, we can postulate effort as 
a function of real wage (w/P) and unemployment U. Utility also depends on the quantities 
consumed of the goods produced in the two sectors of the economy according to the function 
ui
q. The utility of an employed is assumed to be strictly higher than the utility of an 
unemployed. It is in this framework that the representative worker maximizes his utility, and 
firms maximize their profits.  We, therefore, have the following effort function for the 
representative worker.
4 
   U e e
P
w ), ( =                            (2.1) 
where e is the supply of effort, w is the wage rate and P is a price index. A unique optimum 
requires effort to be a continuous strictly concave function, with e1>0,  e2>0,  e11 <0, e22<0. For 
                                                           
4 It is rather easy to provide some theoretical underpinnings for this equation, if we follow the approach suggested 
by Agell and Lundborg (1992) or Akerlof (1982). 4 
analytical convenience, we also assume that the effort function is separable in its arguments, 
and thus e12 = 0.  Moreover, to ensure an interior solution we assume that e is negative 
whenever w is zero. 
Equation (2.1) is crucial to the firm’s optimization problem. We assume that firms in either of 
the two sectors face the same effort function e, and that they set their wages in such a way as to 
minimize the effective wage cost per worker. With the assumption that there is competition in 
the labor markets and perfect intersectoral mobility, the wage rate is the same for all firms. 
Thus, the effective wage cost can be written as v ≡ w/e.  Formally, the optimization problem for 
the representative firm is the following: 
   ] ), /[( U w v Min
P
w =                (2.2)   
subject to 
e<0 for w = 0 
Solving (2.2) gives the following first order condition: 
   0 ) ( 1 = − e
P
w e              (2.3) 
which can be rewritten as 







ε                       (2.4) 
This relationship states that the optimal wage is set such that the elasticity of the effort function 
with respect to the real wage rate is equal to unity. So, equation (2.4) is the traditional Solow 
condition (Solow 1979). 
Totally differentiating equation (2.3) and with the assumption that e12 = 0, we obtain after some 
manipulations the following relationship: 5 
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            (2.5) 
where an caret (^) indicates the percentage change in a variable,  ε11 = (e11/e1)(w/P), and ε2 = 
(e2/e)U.  Since e2>0, we also have that ε2 >0, which is the elasticity of effort with respect to the 
unemployment. Also, by the concavity of the effort function we have that e11<0 which implies 
that ε11<0.  
An important parameter in the following analysis is the elasticity ε11 . It measures the concavity 
of the effort function with respect to w/P. In economic terms, we may think of ε11 as measuring 
the rate at which workers get satisfied with real wages. When ε11  is small, the effort function is 
close to linear, and marginal effort e1 is a slowly declining function of w/P; when ε11   is large, 
e1 declines rapidly with w/P.  
Differentiating totally (2.1) yields: 
                  (2.6)  U P w e ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 2 ε + − =
which says that positive changes in the real wage and/or the unemployment increase the work 
effort. From (2.5) and (2.6) we obtain that: 
                             (2.7) 
                                                               (2.8) 
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Having established the basic relationships regarding the behavior of the firm and the workers, 
we can proceed to the analysis of the tax incidence. However, in order to simplify things we 
shall assume for the rest of our analysis that ε11 = -1. Although this assumption is rather strong 
and implies that the work effort does not change with respect to the real wage, i.e. that work 6 
effort changes only as unemployment changes, we shall adhere to it because the main results of 
our analysis do not change significantly, but our analysis is made much more tractable. 
3.  The two-sector model with efficiency-wages and taxation  
Consider an economy with two sectors of production in which two commodities are produced 
in quantities X and Y. There two factors of production, capital (K) and labor (L), which are 
intersectorally mobile, and in fixed total supply. Product markets are perfectly competitive, 
while in the labor market firms in the two sectors set wages according to the efficiency-wage 
hypothesis. Production functions are assumed to be linearly homogeneous into which capital, 
Ki, and labor in efficiency units, Ei,  enter  as  arguments.        
                            (3.1)
                                (3.2) 
) , ( X X X K E F X =
) , ( Y Y Y K E F Y =
We have Ei = e(w/P, U)Li, where Li is the amount of labor used in sector i. As we mentioned 
earlier, the number of workers, L, is fixed to the economy, while total labor in efficiency units, 
e(...)L, is determined endogenously. 
In the following analysis, we shall examine only two taxes: A capital income tax in sector X, 
and a consumption tax on good X. With these taxes, the dual total cost functions, CX  and CY, to 
the production functions become: 
     X r C C X X X e
w ) , ( =                       (3.3)
     Y r C C Y Y Y e
w ) , ( =                      (3.4) 
where rX = (1+tKX)r = TKXr, r is the net rate of return to capital and tkx is the tax rate on the 
return to capital in the X sector.  With perfect factor mobility, the net returns to capital and 7 
labor will be equalizes across sectors. Assuming that Ci is twice differentiable, we can obtain 
the following equilibrium conditions in factor markets: 
                                  (3.5)
                           (3.6) 
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where Cij are the derivatives of the minimum unit cost functions in the two sectors with respect 
to (effective) factor prices. The LHS of (3.5) specifies the total demand for efficiency labor 
units of the two production sectors, while the RHS defines the effective labor supply in 
efficiency units corrected for the unemployment and multiplied by the economy-wide effort 
level. 
Perfect competition in product markets implies the following zero profit conditions: 
   
                            (3.7) 
                           (3.8) 
X X KX EX p r C v C = +
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where pi is the producer price of commodity i, (i=X,Y). Differentiating totally equations (3.5)-
(3.8), and denoting changes in variables with a caret, we can obtain, after some manipulations 
the following relationships, assuming that    0 ˆ ˆ = = K L
  U C C Y X
U L
U
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where 8 
λEX ≡ CEXX/e(L-U) is the share of efficient labor used in sector X 
λEY ≡ CEYY/e(L-U) is the share of efficient labor used in sector Y 
λKX ≡ CKXX/K is the share of capital used in sector X 
λKY ≡ CKYY/K is the share of capital used in sector Y 
θEi ≡ wCEi/ePi is the share of effective labor cost in producing commodity i,  
θKi ≡ rCKi/Pi is the share of capital cost in producing commodity i, 
From the fact that the unit cost functions are homogeneous of degree zero in factor prices, we 
also have: 
  C                                           (3.12)   
                                           (3.13) 
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By making use of (3.12) - (3.15), we can rewrite equations (3.9) and (3.10) as follows: 
U r w T r w Y X
U L
U
Y KY EY KX X KX EX EY EX ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ
− − − + − − = + σ θ λ σ θ λ λ λ                                (3.16) 
) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ r w T r w Y X Y EY KY KX X EX KX KY KX − + − − − = + σ θ λ σ θ λ λ λ                                      (3.17) 
where σI  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in efficiency units in the ith 
sector. 
From equations (3.16) and (3.17) we can obtain: 
U
U L
U r w Y X Y X ˆ ) ˆ ˆ )( ( ) ˆ ˆ (
−
− − + = − δ δ λ                  (3.18) 9 
where   
λ = λEX-λKX=λKY-λEY 
δX ≡ (λEXθKX + λKXθEX)σX 
δY ≡ (λEYθKY + λKYθEY)σY 
In proceeding to our analysis we shall assume that commodity Y is taken as the numeraire, and 
therefore its price pY = 1. If we define the price index P to be equal to a weighted average of 
the consumer prices of the two commodities, i.e.  where q
γ γ − + =
1
Y X q q P i is the consumer price 
of commodity i, and γ and 1-γ 
 are  the weights of commodity X and Y respectively in the index, 
then  
                                   (3.19)  Y X q q P ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ γ γ − + =
Let us assume that a commodity tax is imposed on X at a rate τX so that qX = pX(1+ τX ) = pXTX . 
Since no tax is imposed on Y, qY = pY = 1. Therefore, the price index reduces to .  For 
simplicity, we shall assume, without any loss of generality, that  
X q P ˆ ˆ γ =
                             (3.19a)  X q P ˆ ˆ =
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On the consumption side, we assume that consumers have identical and homothetic 
preferences, so that relative demand for the two commodities depends on relative prices only,  
 
                                                           
5 For more details see appendix. 10 
i.e. DX/DY = f (qX/qY).
 6  
Given that we assume a closed economy, DX = X, and DY = Y, total differentiation yields.
7 
                                                          (3.21)  X D q Y X ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( σ − = −
where σD is the elasticity of substitution between X and Y in consumption. 
From (3.11) and (3.12), we can also obtain that: 
                                     (3.22)  KX X T p r w ˆ ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( − = − θ
We have thus established the basic relations of our model, (3.20)-(3.22), which can be solved 
for ,( , and  , unemployment and real wages.  ) ˆ ˆ ( r w − ) ˆ ˆ Y X − X p ˆ
 
4.  The incidence of factor and commodity taxes 
4.1.  The incidence of a factor income tax 
We shall examine first the incidence of a tax on capital in the X-sector. By setting T
*
X = 0, we 
obtain by solving simultaneously equations (3.20)-(3.22), the following relationships: 
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6 The assumption of homothetic preferences is rather usual in the theory of tax incidence. For further details, see for example, 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).  
7 With some rather minor changes the analysis could be easily extended for an open economy. 11 
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where ∆ = λθ(σD+σs), and σs is the supply-elasticity of substitution between X and Y in the 
production, and it is positive.
8 Assuming that there are no other distortions in the economy, 
before the imposition of the factor tax, it can be shown that ∆ is positive.
9  
Let us consider first the effects of taxation on relative factor prices, and compare our results 
with those derived by Harberger (1962), in his classic treatment of the incidence of the 
corporate income tax. The change in the wage-rental ratio depends on three effects, the output 
effect (-λθKXσD), the factor substitution effect (δX) and the unemployment effect UθKX/(L-U)ε2. 
Comparing this formula with the corresponding formula of Harberger, we observe that the only 
difference between the two is the unemployment effect.
10  The factor substitution effect and the 
unemployment effect are positive, while the sign of the output effect is ambiguous depending 
on the sign of λ. If the X-sector is relatively capital intensive λ is negative and the output effect 
positive. If on the other hand, the X-sector is labor intensive λ>o, and the output effect is 
negative. The effects of the output and substitution effects have been analyzed extensively (e.g. 
Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980), and thus we shall limit our analysis to the influence of the 
unemployment effect.  Since it is positive, it works in favor of labor. To see this more clearly, 
we can examine two extreme cases under the assumption that the X-sector is relatively labor 
intensive, i.e. λ>0.  
                                                           
8 For the exact definition of σs see appendix. 
9 For more details see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) or Neary (1978). 
10  The distinction in output and substitution effects was originally made by Mieszkowski (1967). 12 
First, assume that σX =0, which implies that δX =0. In the standard Harbergerian model, where 
the unemployment effect is absent, the wage rate falls relative to the rental to capital. In the 
present model, however, there is also the unemployment effect which is positive and may even 
outweigh the negative output effect. So it is possible that the wage -rental ratio rises, and in any 
case it will be higher than in the simple Harbergerian model. Secondly, consider the case where 
λ=0, that is, both sectors have initially the same factor intensities, and σX=0. In the Harberger 
model, the wage-rental ratio remains unchanged. In our model, however, the wage-rental ratio 
rises. An intuitive explanation could be the following. In the Harbergerian approach, with the 
above assumptions, the imposition of the tax on capital in X is equivalent to a tax on X, and 
raises the price of X (see eq. 4.3) leading to a reduction in its demand. To accommodate this 
reduced demand the X industry releases capital and labor in the proportion that these factors are 
used in the production of X. If the Y industry uses these factors in the same proportions then it 
can expand its production to meet the increased demand. Since the capital/labor ratio in Y is 
unchanged, the w/r ratio is also unchanged. Hence, w and r both fall relative to pX in the same 
proportion. In our model, however, the unemployment effect leads to an increase in the w/r 
ratio. An explanation could be the following. With the above assumptions the real wage falls 
(see eq. 4.5), and unemployment rises so that the work-effort rises, as assumed. However, the 
higher the level of unemployment the lower the labor-capital ratio, and as a result the higher 
the marginal productivity of labor.  
It is clear from the above analysis that the tax incidence may be quite different from the results 
derived by Harberger, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. What is of particular 
interest is the presence of unemployment. As equation (4.4) reveals the effect of capital income 
taxation on unemployment depends on relative factor intensities. If the taxed sector is relatively 
labor intensive, i.e. λ>0, then unemployment will rise. If, on the other hand, the taxed sector is 13 
relatively capital intensive (λ<0), then the change in unemployment depends on the relative 
strength of the factor substitutability in the untaxed sector (δY). If it is small then 
unemployment will fall, while if it is large enough to outweigh the term λθKYσD then 
unemployment will rise. The policy conclusion is, therefore, that a capital income tax may 
reduce unemployment as long as it is imposed on the relatively capital intensive sector of the 
economy and the factor substitutability in the untaxed sector is very low. 
With regard to the effects of taxation on sectoral output composition and output prices, they are 
qualitatively the same with those derived from the standard Harbergerian analysis. What is 
worth examining is the supply of effective labor, which is variable, while in the analysis of 
Harberger, labor supply is fixed. Differentiating totally the effective labor supply function Es = 
e[(w/q), U](L-U), we obtain, after some manipulations that: 
   KX X S T p w E
U L
U ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ
− − =                        (4.6) 
Given that the real wage falls, it is clear that the effective labor supply falls as a result of the 
imposition of the capital income tax. Having examined the effects of capital income tax, we 
can turn now to the examination of the effects of a consumption tax on the output of sector X. 
4.2  The incidence of a commodity tax 
By assuming  , and  , we have a difference between producer prices (p) and 
consumer prices (q), which is due to the commodity tax on X. Solving simultaneously 
equations (3.23)-(3.22), we obtain: 
0 ˆ = KX T 0 ˆ > X T
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It is again clear that the unemployment effect may have important implications on income 
distribution and commodity prices.  With regard to the wage/rental ratio, we observe that the 
unemployment effect may change the results of the standard model. Consider, for example, the 
case where σD = 0, (or that λ=0). In such a case, the w/r would remain unchanged in the 
standard model while in our model the wage rate would benefit in relation with the rental to 
capital. It is worth examining also what happens to the consumer and producer prices. The 
consumer price qX rises unambiguously, while the producer price of the taxed commodity pX 
may fall or rise depending not only on relative factor intensities, but also on the unemployment 
effect; and the unemployment effect works in favor of the producers. Finally, with regard to the 
unemployment, we observe that if the taxed sector is relatively capital intensive then the tax 
will lead to an increase in unemployment. If the taxed sector is relatively capital intensive, then 
unemployment may fall, if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the two 
sectors is small. 
5. Some concluding remarks 
Most of the extensions of the classic model for tax incidence developed by Harberger were 
based on the assumption of full employment. In our analysis we have examined tax incidence 
in a model with efficiency wages. The introduction of efficiency wages makes effective labor 
supply endogenous, and as a result we can have involuntary unemployment. With the effort 
function depending on the real wage and unemployment, we derived a relationship between 
effort, real wage and unemployment. Assuming identical effort functions across the two sectors 15 
of a simple general equilibrium model, we are in a position to have the competitive model, with 
perfect competition in all markets, with unemployment. 
In this framework, we analyze the effects of a corporate and a consumption tax on income 
distribution, prices, and unemployment. Our findings differ significantly from those derived by 
Harberger, but also the analyses, which extended the Harberger model. 
When effort function depends on unemployment, a corporate income tax may lead to a 
reduction of unemployment, depending on the labor intensity of the taxed sector, and the level 
of unemployment. Moreover the distribution of income is also affected and the traditional 
results change not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. Similarly a consumption tax may 
lead to a reduction in unemployment as long as it is imposed on the capital intensive 
commodity. 
As our analysis has shown, the traditional general equilibrium model can be significantly 
enriched and become more realistic, with the introduction of efficiency wages. It also yields 
results that differ from those derived by the full employment neoclassical model, and can lead 











Following Agell and Lunborg (1992) and Akerlof (1982), we can specify a utility function 
which is maximized by the representative employed worker as follows: 
Max U
e(e,U)U
q(X,Y) Subject to w= PX Tx X + PY TY Y=qX X + qY Y,  
with e = e [(w/P), U], and where  PX , Tx ,X , PY  TY , Y, qX , qY ,  are defined in the paper. 
The first order conditions become 
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where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Equation (A1) defines e as an implicit function of w/P, and 
U, i.e. we can write the effort function as 
e = e [(w/P), U], which is equation (2.1) of the text. 
To obtain (3.20), we substitute (2.5) into (3.18), which yields  
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Making use of (3.11), and setting ε11 = -1, yields (3.20). 
Finally, σs the supply-elasticity of substitution between X and Y in the production is defined as 
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